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This paper attempts to develop an ethico-aesthetic framework for enriching one’s life and ethical 
outlook. Drawing primarily from Nietzsche, Foucault, and Heidegger, an argument is made that 
Heidegger’s understanding of this issue was mistaken. The ontological crisis of modernity is not 
the overt influence of mathematics as a worldview over poetics and more traditionally aesthetic 
approaches. It is the rampant mis- and over-application of abstraction within one's view of the 
world while denying the material realities of life as we live it. This runaway abstractive 
worldview leads to the misapplication of mathematics and other sciences which in turn facilitate 
the dehumanization of life and those within it. When we try to solve the real problems of our 
material human lives through overly abstractive means, then we arrive at inauthentic arguments 
that fuel popular disdain for philosophy as irrelevant and nothing more than the purview of the 
elite. The goal is a recalibration of the argument toward addressing the denial of materiality 
within Modernism.  
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If something sacred can be made unsacred, then perhaps it should not be sacred in the 
first place. A rather worn-out critique of the sciences is that they do just that. They demystify the 
world and destroy humanity’s notions of what is sacred, what is spiritual, and what is true. Often 
this critique comes from religious communities whose doctrines are challenged by scientific 
discoveries, most notably those of astronomy regarding the age of the universe and its possible 
origins. However, there is another source of tension to be found within philosophy that scientists 
have long been aware of. It is the critique of a mathematical view of the universe and what is 
perceived as the resulting limitations and distortions of Being that such a view produces. 
Metaphysics, which was once considered a proper science, is similarly attacked for applying 
mathematical logic to the study of Being and obfuscating essential qualitative truths within a fog 
of quantified results. For an inquiry into ethico-aesthetics, this may seem to be a strange starting 
point, but the goal is to re-calibrate this critique. 
The issue is not mathematization itself. The issue is the inappropriate application of 
mathematics and logic toward ends that cannot be measured as such. If I am to deliver my vision 
of what an ethico-aesthetic critique should be and how it is to function in my life, then it will be 
through embracing an aesthetic appreciation for the wonders of mathematics geared towards 
engendering the ethical treatment of the Other as part of the same material reality I inhabit. It is 
not that mensuration is a negative praxis to apply to one’s life. It is that mathematics is 
envisioned as an immaterial field of knowledge instead of the expression of real material 
relationships between entities. This kind of inaccurate abstraction of the material world has led to 
flawed ethical arguments and missed opportunities for aesthetic interpretations. One may think 
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that the conflict at hand is between logic/math and poetics, but this is only one expression of the 
deeper fight between material and ideal realities. 
Martin Heidegger’s  The Question Concerning Technology focuses on revealing what he 
calls the essence of modern technology:  gestell .  Gestell , or enframing, and technology are not the 
same thing. The Heideggerian understanding of technology is taken from the Greek  techne , 
which is a type of  poiesis , or revealing of truth, that involves the use of tools and skills 
associated with them (Heidegger 318-9). To understand what is meant by  modern  technology in 
contrast—which is where  gestell enters—Heidegger points out that pre-modern technologies 
were more passive by nature. 
The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and 
stored as such. But does this not hold for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do 
indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the 
windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it (320). 
His argument connects this challenging relationship with nature to a collective delusion that the 
world exists only to serve of resources to satisfy the desires of humanity (332).  Gestell is a 
manipulative force that reduces people and materials into resources to be used/exploited and 
limits their perceived potential as anything else. Heidegger uses the term "standing-reserve" to 
describe the  gestell  view of people and things, which is an effective summation of this effect 
(322).  Gestell  is the hyper-capitalist approach to interacting with the world and Heidegger calls it 
out as dangerous since it can come to dominate one's entire worldview. To measure all of 
existence with the sole intention of exploiting its resources reshapes one’s understanding of life 
and makes such behavior seem totally natural (339). It is similar to a disease that infects the brain 
in order to hide that one has the disease in the first place—like a psychological parasitic virus. 
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Heidegger points out that along with technology in a broad sense “art was simply called 
techne ” in ancient Greece before the dawn of aesthetics (ibid). About the same time that Kant 
began his work in aesthetics, others began to discuss art on aesthetic and philosophical terms. 
Before this, none of the ‘art practices’ we envision today were seen as anything distinct from 
handicraft traditions. The reason the craft traditions are more readily seen as ‘technological’ is 
because of the lack of aesthetic attention paid to them in contrast to what we consider art in the 
Western world. Craft’s avoidance of this sort of scrutiny allowed it to have a more organic and 
material relationship with technology simply as one facet of a larger problem-solving praxis. The 
poiesis  that took place was equally rooted in the material world as a sort of lived or embodied 
knowledge of one’s connection to the world around them. 
That is why Heidegger uses the word ‘modern’ when talking about  gestell  and 
technology. He recognizes a shift from archaic to modern capitalist-adjacent technological 
behaviors that allow  gestell  to rise up at a rate never before experienced. Even though it has 
always been a part of the human psyche, the  gestell  virus—to continue the  earlier metaphor—is 
now able to spread and strengthen faster than ever. To illustrate, consider that other diseases like 
the recent Ebola outbreak became epidemic crises mainly due to air/sea travel and urban 
population shifts that provided fast-tracks for their spread. Bacterial infections like Staph have 
become more deadly not due to their nature, but as the result of our simultaneous tendencies to 
reduce healthy exposure to bacteria as children and the widespread overuse of antibiotics. We 
have created conditions for these already existent dangers to grow in power and threat. I argue 
that modern technology is not the source of  gestell . It is not even the first way that this pattern of 
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behavior has entered into the history of our species. It is just the most violent and accelerated 
vector for its growth. 
Peter Sloterdijk's concept of atmo-terrorism is an example of how technology can be 
distorted and perverted when combined with an abstracted view of human beings. He recounts 
how in the early twentieth century the neutral tools of pest control were twisted into the means of 
exterminating people as pests. Chemicals like hydrogen cyanide and the infamous Zyklon A 
were developed with the sole intention of helping people (Sloterdijk 30-4). Though these 
poisonous gasses are objectively harmful substances to most living creatures, with regard to 
human society they were intended to make life healthier and safer by limiting insect infestation 
and the damage of such situations. The tragic turn was when Nazi officials began branding 
Jewish and other marginal groups as ‘pests’ and ‘vermin’ instead of human beings. Sloterdijk 
points out that these descriptors, “having been a constitutive element of the Hitler-forged Nazi 
party rhetoric since the early twenties, after 1933 [...] became a sort of official rule of language 
for a subjugated German public” (43). The genocide against entire populations within Nazi 
Germany was then justified as an act of protection and sanitation. The mathematization of this 
process via body counts, fine-tuning facilities of mass execution, and the implementation of 
Zyklon B as a more effective ‘pest-control’ measure were only possible after the victims of this 
genocide were abstracted into faceless elements within a larger grouping. Both the people and 
the technologies were ‘enframed,’ or bound into a limited definition of what each could be, in 
order to feed a desire for exploitation and domination. Nuclear power is another example of this 
process. While nuclear warfare is a horrid and irredeemable strategy, the tool of nuclear fission is 
also capable of great good as seen in nuclear power plants, medical radiography, and countless 
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scientific and industrial uses that demonstrably improve human life. The tool one uses is not the 
source of the evil we recognize in such perversions of technology and science. The source is the 
confluence of conditions that enframe those tools toward a specific and dehumanized end. To 
ignore this is an unethical treatment of the tool being assessed which enframes its objecthood just 
as a person can have done to their personhood. 
Michel Foucault's analysis of torture through newly developed punishments and 
non-invasive environmental punishment is another example of how the application of technology 
is secondary to the societal conditions it is enacted within. When “the body as the major target of 
penal repression disappeared,” a process began within Western justice systems that sought to 
disembody the act of doling out punishment (Foucault 8). The soul or the mind of the one being 
punished became the actual target of this justice system as the spectacle of public punishment 
was deemphasized (16). Even when execution were public during this transition, it was carried 
out in a detached manner with little to no human contact with the condemned. 
The guillotine takes life almost without touching the body, just as the prison 
deprives of liberty or a fine reduces wealth. It is intended to apply the law not so 
much to a real body capable of feeling pain as to a juridical subject, the possessor, 
among other rights, of the right to exist. It had to have the abstraction of the law 
itself (13). 
This abstraction has had a terrifying ripple effect that we still feel today in how prisons are so 
easily seen not as places to help real people correct ill-begotten behaviors and delusions, but as 
places to quarantine dangerous criminal ‘elements’ that endanger those whose personhood we 
agree to recognize. This was the very same approach the Nazis took towards Jewish peoples that 
Sloterdijk reminds us of. When Foucault points out a 1958 ruling that resulted in judgements 
being predicated on a subjects susceptibility to punishment, the curability of their criminal 
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condition, and the danger they pose to society, one could argue it as  gestell or rampant 
mensuration at the core of a dehumanizing practice (21). Yet, it is not the measuring of the 
person that is to blame here. That sort of quantification of a person is only possible if one accepts 
an abstracted view of the subject as something other than a thinking breathing being made of 
flesh and bone and therefore open to all the flaws and misdirections of a material body. To 
imagine the soul or mind of the criminal as separate from their body allows one to ignore the 
material conditions of their life and the neurobiological impacts of those conditions. It allows 
one to ignore systemic issues of real social groups that fall victim to exploitation and 
marginalization via material means and the way that exploitation manifests as social unrest and 
decay. 
 When Hannah Arendt states that “while a temptation where one’s life is at stake may be 
a legal excuse for a crime, it certainly is not a moral justification,” she enacts the very same 
abstractive methodology at work in the dehumanizing penal system and a  gestell -based 
worldview (Arendt 18). To understand her stance in  Responsibility and Judgement , it is 
important to remember Arendt’s lived experience as a Jewish woman carrying out a 
philosophical project informed by the atrocities and subsequent trials of Nazi war criminals. The 
statement above on temptation and moral justification is made from a place seeking to prevent 
any sort of legal trickery that could possibly excuse the likes of Eichmann, other Nazis, and their 
sympathizers. Arendt makes her argument rather effectively by attacking the logical fallacies of 
collective/cultural guilt and the flawed notion that blaming an individual as personally 
responsible for acts of great magnitude is harmful to the notion of free agency (20-1, 28-9). 
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At times, it would seem that this project attempts to bring material reality into a deep 
ethical discourse by not allowing individuals to become abstracted into anthropological units that 
express some ideal aspect of an entire culture. However, her failure to sympathize with the 
situation of African-American families in Little Rock during the desegregation of US public 
schools reveals that her ethical system bears the same mark of immateriality as those previously 
mentioned. The notion of free agency is treated as an absolute and almost sacred human feature 
and fuels her argument that forced desegregation is harmful to all those involved (194-5). 
To force parents to send their children to an integrated school against their will 
means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free 
societies—the private right over their children and the social right to free 
association (212). 
Such a stance places individual needs, desires, and assumed rights above those of the collective. 
Arendt is correct in that desegregation overrode the free agency of many in the American South 
who would have preferred to maintain the status quo of racial isolation. However, her 
sanctification of free agency results in her ethical system being unable to tolerate any challenge 
to said freedom no matter the social benefit to be gained. The reality of desegregation was a 
systemic pattern of racial oppression of African-Americans that deprived their schools and 
communities of resources, stability, government support, and police protection. The isolation of 
these communities from White society—which wielded this oppressive power—bred ignorance 
of this situation and perpetuated falsehoods about the nature of African-American culture 
designed to make segregation and racial oppression seem natural and justifiable. They were 
enframed according to the dominant White narrative of the time. Arendt herself falls victim to 
some degree of this very mindset, despite her own experiences of cultural discrimination. The 
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sanctity of free agency creates a critical flaw in this ethical structure that allows personal liberty 
to overshadow the horror of racism and the real harm it inflicts upon entire social groups. 
In a 1996 piece for  Skeptical Inquirer , Carl Sagan relates a story about the physicist 
Robert W. Wood in which Wood is asked to respond to a toast of, “To physics and metaphysics.” 
Wood briefly lays out the basis of the scientific method and how a scientist in this situation “is 
devoted only to what the experiment teaches,” not to proving that his idea is in fact true (Sagan). 
Towards the end of his response, Wood explains the key difference between metaphysics and 
physics. 
The difference between physics and metaphysics, Wood concluded as he raised 
his glass high, is not that the practitioners of one are smarter than the practitioners 
of the other. The difference is that the metaphysicist has no laboratory (ibid). 
Science, physics, mathematics, logic, whatever specific term we use for this praxis is rather 
irrelevant to the current argument. All of them are distinct from metaphysics in that they are 
materially-bound in their reasoning. There are, of course, areas of flawed practice within each 
and theories that may yet be unraveled as erroneous or based on false pretenses. That should not, 
however, be used as a foil to blame a perceived dehumanization of contemporary life on the 
entirety of logical and scientific practice. 
In the same article, Sagan briefly references Nietzsche’s hostility towards science due to 
its ability to dethrone humanity from a place of superiority. 
Has not man’s self-deprecation, his  will to self-deprecation, been untsoppably on 
the increase since Copernicus? Gone, alas, is his faith in his dignity, uniqueness, 
irreplaceableness in the rank of beings - he has become  animal , literally, 
unqualifiedly and unreservedly an animal, man who in his earlier faiths was 
almost God (Nietzsche 115). 
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This is similar to Heidegger’s worry regarding “the current emptiness of the word ‘being,’ the 
disappearance of its original strength of calling and presentness” (qtd. Smith 45). Perhaps this 
devaluing of existential Being is traceable back to a scientific and mathematized view of the 
world. Maybe such views are indeed to blame for the desanctification of Being. Is this truly a 
bad thing, though? I propose an ethico-aesthetic praxis based on Sagan’s stance that “it is far 
better to grasp the Universe as it really is than to persist in delusion, however satisfying and 
reassuring” (Sagan). The phrase ‘as it really is,’ refers to  material  reality. This is my breaking 
point with traditional metaphysics as I find no benefit in treating immaterial concepts as if they 
are real outside of our minds. The notion of Being, in its proper noun sense, tacitly invites us to 
assume it has some real and measurable property, that we can perceive it in a manner similar to 
our physical health. It is the way in which metaphysics presents itself that causes the misuse of 
logic and mensuration. If “mathism and scientism [are] in fact the cause of worldwide 
dehumanization” then it is only because of their inappropriate use (Smith 38). To attack logic or 
mathematics misses the real problem at hand. Seeing the concepts of logic,  gestell , technology, 
etc as singular monolithic things outside of material human life perpetuates the problem of false 
immateriality. Metaphysicians are open to criticism not because of their use of mensuration, but 
because of their use of it upon immaterial and incalculable concepts. If someone tries to drive a 
nail into wood with a screwdriver, one should not blame the nail or the tool in hand for any lack 
of progress. Blame rests squarely with person holding the screwdriver and their assumption that 
it is the best tool for their current task.  
If we look to Smith’s claim that “Greek consciousness had been, in the time of 
Parmenides, a living dialogic between Dionysian wonderment and Apollonian logic,” then we 
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see a stark similarity to that of a scientifically-informed ethico-aesthetic praxis (42). Using logic 
and empirical data as a backdrop, we should endeavour toward a form of ethics that is supported 
by an aesthetic appreciation of the complexity and nuance to be found in a materially-bound 
view of existence. To reduce our entire species to that of animals capable of logic, agency, etc, is 
not something to fear as Nietzsche would have us believe. It makes human capacity all the more 
precious and wonderful as the beautiful coalescence of random events that have generated the 
very ability to recognize that pattern of causality. Any ethical stance must take this into account 
in order to recognize how complicated and interconnected life is; how there are always systemic 
issues at work that are informed by material factors and other systemic processes. We cannot 
generalize such complexity and have it be reflective of reality. I see Heidegger's caution about 
gestell  carrying a deeper warning. When we try to solve the real problems of our material human 
lives—the ethics of bodies, minds, ideas, technologies, cultures, and more—through means that 
do not follow the same basic rules and limitations of those lives, then we arrive at inauthentic 
arguments that fuel popular disdain for philosophy as irrelevant to real life and nothing more 
than the purview of the elite. An ethico-aesthetic praxis as laid out here actively resists such 
inauthenticity and re-calibrates the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics away from mathism 
and scientism towards reconciling the discipline with our own blatant materiality.  
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